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Abstract
This introduces the symposium on judgment aggregation. The theory of judgment ag-
gregation asks how several individuals￿judgments on some logically connected propo-
sitions can be aggregated into consistent collective judgments. The aim of this intro-
duction is to show how ideas from the familiar theory of preference aggregation can
be extended to this more general case. We ￿rst translate a proof of Arrow￿ s impos-
sibility theorem into the new setting, so as to motivate some of the central concepts
and conditions leading to analogous impossibilities, as discussed in the symposium.
We then consider each of four possible escape-routes explored in the symposium.
JEL classi￿cation: D70, D71
Keywords: Judgment aggregation, Arrow￿ s theorem; escape routes
1 Introduction
Ever since the publication of Arrow￿ s classic book, Social Choice and Individual Values [1],
the theory of aggregation has been a thriving area of research. Arrow￿ s book focused on the
aggregation of preferences, understood as the aggregation of multiple individual orderings
over a set of mutually exclusive alternatives into a corresponding collective ordering or
collective choice. Since the need to aggregate preferences arises in many economic and
political contexts, Arrow￿ s work struck a chord with scholars across the social sciences.
In fact, the interest in preference aggregation goes back at least to Condorcet and, less
formally, to Rousseau in the 18th century, but possibly even to medieval scholars such
as Ramon Llull (circa 1232-1315) and Nicolaus Cusanus (1401-1464) (McLean [40]). The
broad relevance of the problem of preference aggregation and especially the power and
elegance of Arrow￿ s axiomatic approach may also explain why the bulk of almost six
decades of social-choice-theoretic research has focused on the aggregation of preferences
or on the closely related problems of aggregating individual utilities or individual welfare.
￿C. List, Departments of Government and Philosophy, London School of Economics; B. Polak, Depart-
ment of Economics and School of Management, Yale University. The present symposium is based on a
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1But there are many contexts in which we want to aggregate individuals￿opinions or
judgments apart from mere preferences. For example, consider a court of several judges
who must decide a case. We may be interested not only in the court￿ s ￿nal judgment in the
case (e.g., whether the defendant is liable) but also in its ￿ndings on the facts of the case
(did the defendant do some harm) and on the question of the relevant legal obligation (was
the defendant obliged not to do this harm). Thus we may want to aggregate the judges￿
individual opinions on each of these issues. Elsewhere, consider a search committee charged
to select among job candidates. Here, we may be interested not only in the committee￿ s
￿nal selection of which candidates to hire, but also in their ￿ndings on whether each
candidate meets certain criteria for the job, and maybe even in their judgment on which
criteria must be met by any successful candidate. Again, we may want to aggregate the
committee members￿ opinions on each of these issues. Or thirdly, consider an expert
panel that is asked to give advice on a set of complex scienti￿c questions. Here, we
may be interested not only in the panel￿ s view on whether there will be a critical global
temperature increase, but also in their judgments on whether various kinds of emissions are
above certain thresholds, and what the signi￿cance of those thresholds is. Other types of
opinions that we might want to aggregate but which are distinct from preferences include
categorizations, say, of animals into species or collections of symptoms into a de￿ned
disease.
These aggregation problems di⁄er from preference aggregation not just in their inter-
pretation, but also in the constraints governing them. Aggregation problems are generally
governed by three types of constraints: constraints on the individual inputs (such as univer-
sal domain), constraints on the collective outputs (such as transitivity and completeness),
and constraints on the relationship between the inputs and outputs (such as Arrow￿ s inde-
pendence or Pareto conditions). In Arrovian preference aggregation problems, the inputs
and outputs are constrained to be complete and transitive preference orderings. Once we
move from preference aggregation to more general aggregation problems, input and output
constraints can take the form of requiring sets of accepted positions to be logically consis-
tent (relative to an appropriate criterion of consistency). In the legal setting, for example,
we typically want to exclude the combined collective ￿nding that ￿ the defendant did it￿ ,
￿ he was obliged not to do it￿ , but ￿ he is not liable￿(following the background constraint
that harm and obligation are necessary and su¢ cient for liability). In an expert panel, we
want the overall collective viewpoint to be logically coherent. Elsewhere, input and output
constraints may come from feasibility conditions. In our hiring-committee setting, there
may be a maximum number of candidates we can hire. Alternatively, more complicated
constraints might be imposed on the search committee by a higher authority: for example,
they may have to hire at least two candidates of which one, at least, must be a woman. In
problems of placing items into categories, we may want to restrict the inputs and outputs
to partitions or perhaps nested collections of the items.
This paper ￿and the symposium it introduces ￿is devoted to a recent e⁄ort to develop
a general theory that can address these and other problems of aggregation: the theory
of judgment aggregation. The theory￿ s central question can be summarized as follows.
Suppose a group of individuals is faced with a set of binary questions, each admitting
a ￿ yes/no￿or ￿ true/false￿answer. Suppose, further, the questions are interconnected, in
that the answers given to some of them constrain the answers that can consistently be
given to others. How, then, can the group arrive at a consistent collective set of answers
to these questions, based on its members￿individual answers? This problem, formulated
2in the present form by List and Pettit [36, 37] with precursors in Guilbaud [27], Wilson
[61] and Rubinstein and Fishburn [56], is surprisingly general and, as will become clear,
subsumes the aggregation problems mentioned above, including the problem of preference
aggregation.
The focus of this introductory paper will be to show how ideas from preference aggre-
gation translate into new ideas in the more general setting of judgment aggregation. In
part, we hope this o⁄ers a bridge to the new literature for those familiar with the old. We
also hope to illustrate what is and what is not immediately generalizable from classical
social choice theory to judgment aggregation, and what those generalizations look like.
For example, the recent literature on judgment aggregation started with a generalization
of Condorcet￿ s paradox (List and Pettit [36, 37]): Just as majority voting can yield cyclical
collective preferences, so majority voting on any set of binary issues with certain logical
interconnections can lead to inconsistent collective judgments.1
To illustrate, return to the expert-panel example above. Let p be the proposition that
CO2 emissions are above a given threshold; let p ! q be the proposition that if CO2
emissions are above that threshold, then there will be a critical temperature increase; and
let q be the proposition that there will be a critical temperature increase. Consider the
two matrices in Table 1, one representing the opinions of an illustrative panel of experts
and the other representing the preferences in Condorcet￿ s classic paradox. In each case, all
three individuals hold perfectly consistent opinions, in the expert-panel case understood in
terms of propositional logic and in Condorcet￿ s case understood in terms of the standard
transitivity and completeness conditions on preferences. In both cases, majority voting
fails to preserve consistency from the individual to the collective level: The majority
opinions are inconsistent by the relevant criteria. A similar pattern can occur even with
the intuitively simplest of all logical connections, such as those between two propositions
(p;q) and their conjunction (p ^ q).
p p ! q :q x ￿ y y ￿ z z ￿ x
Individual1
fp;p ! q;qg
X X ￿
Individual1
x ￿ y ￿ z
X X ￿
Individual2
f:p;p ! q;:qg
￿ X X
Individual2
y ￿ z ￿ x
￿ X X
Individual3
fp;:(p ! q);:qg
X ￿ X
Individual3
z ￿ x ￿ y
X ￿ X
Majority X X X Majority X X X
Table 1: The problem of majority inconsistency
Given this relationship between Condorcet￿ s paradox and the more general problem of
majority inconsistency, it is natural to ask whether Arrow￿ s impossibility theorem can be
generalized as well. Just as Arrow￿ s theorem shows that Condorcet￿ s paradox is the tip
of the iceberg of a deeper impossibility result on preference aggregation, so one may ask
whether the problem of majority inconsistency is an instance of a more general di¢ culty
1This observation ￿often called the discursive dilemma (see also Pettit [53], Brennan [3]) ￿was inspired
by a related but distinct observation in the study of decision making in collegial courts, the so-called
doctrinal paradox (Kornhauser and Sager [30, 31], Kornhauser [29]). The doctrinal paradox consists in
the fact that in decisions on a conclusion, such as whether a defendant is liable, based on several logically
related premises, such as whether he did some harm and whether he was obliged not to do it, majority
voting on the premises may support a di⁄erent decision from majority voting on the conclusion.
3in judgment aggregation. The literature now contains a sequence of results in response to
this question, some of which are included in the present symposium and will be reviewed
in detail below. The gist of these results is that, for a large class of aggregation prob-
lems, there exist no aggregation rules satisfying some Arrow-inspired conditions such as a
universal domain condition, a collective rationality condition, an informational condition
akin to Arrow￿ s independence of irrelevant alternatives, and some minimal democratic
conditions such as unanimity preservation, non-dictatorship or anonymity.
These results, in turn, can be traced back to three di⁄erent intellectual origins: some
work on abstract algebraic aggregation,2 some logic-based work on judgment aggregation,3
and some related work on strategy-proof social choice.4 However, as will become clear, the
literature has not been con￿ned to proving impossibility results, but has also considered
how to avoid them. Arguably, the key contribution of the impossibility results is precisely
to give us some insights into which requirements on aggregation can be upheld, and which
must be relaxed, in order to arrive at compelling solutions to various aggregation problems.
(For literature reviews, see List and Puppe [38] and List [35].)
The present paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we introduce the logic-based
model of judgment aggregation, following List and Pettit [36] and Dietrich [6]. In Section
3, we discuss how Arrow￿ s impossibility theorem generalizes from preference aggregation
to general judgment-aggregation settings, thereby introducing the ￿rst two symposium
papers (Nehring and Puppe [49], Dokow and Holzman [23]) and some related results
(e.g., Dietrich and List [9]). In Section 4, we turn to several positive results on how
to avoid the Arrovian impossibility in judgment aggregation and introduce the following
￿ve symposium papers (Dietrich and List [16], Dokow and Holzman [24], Dietrich and
Mongin [20], Nehring and Puppe [50], Dietrich [8]). In Section 5, we comment on the
relationship between the logic-based model of judgment aggregation and the alternative,
abstract algebraic model. In Section 6, we o⁄er some concluding remarks on future avenues
of research.
2 The logic-based model
Let N = f1;2;:::;ng be a ￿nite set of individuals (n ￿ 2) faced with a judgment aggregation
problem. The set of propositions on which judgments are to be made is called the agenda
and de￿ned as a set X of sentences from a suitable logic, where X is non-empty, closed
under negation (i.e., if p 2 X, then :p 2 X, where : stands for ￿ not￿ ) and, for our
purposes, ￿nite. Propositions are denoted p, q, r, and so on. We assume that double
negations cancel each other out. The set X might contain not just atomic propositions
but also compound propositions such as p ^ q (￿ p and q￿ ) or p ! q (￿ if p then q￿ ). In the
2Wilson [61], followed by Rubinstein and Fishburn [56] and Dokow and Holzman [23] in this sympo-
sium, developed an abstract algebraic framework for studying the aggregation of attributes distinct from
preferences and proved a theorem that generalizes Arrow￿ s theorem in this framework.
3List and Pettit [36, 37] introduced a logic-based model of judgment aggregation and proved an im-
possibility theorem that also has a corollary for preference aggregation. This work was strengthened and
extended by Pauly and van Hees [52], Dietrich [5, 6] and others, and generalized to subsume Arrow￿ s
theorem (Dietrich and List [9]).
4Nehring and Puppe [47] proved some results on strategy-proof social choice, which have several corol-
laries for judgment aggregation, including Arrovian-style results, as presented in this symposium (Nehring
and Puppe [49]).
4introductory expert-panel example, the agenda is
X = fp;:p;p ! q;:(p ! q);q;:qg,
and in a preference aggregation problem over three alternatives x, y and z, it is
X = fx ￿ y;y ￿ x;x ￿ z;z ￿ x;y ￿ z;z ￿ yg,
with the stipulation that x ￿ y is the negation of y ￿ x and so on.
Each individual i￿ s judgment set is the set of propositions Ji ￿ X that he or she
accepts (e.g., endorses or believes to be true). A judgment set is called consistent if it is
a consistent set in the relevant sense of the logic (more on this below). It is complete if it
contains a member of each proposition-negation pair p;:p 2 X. An n-tuple of judgment
sets across the individuals in N, (J1;:::;Jn), is called a pro￿le.
An aggregation rule is a function F that assigns to each pro￿le of individual judgment
sets (J1;:::;Jn) in some domain a collective judgment set J = F(J1;:::;Jn), interpreted
as the set of propositions accepted by the group N as a whole. Usually, we require the
domain of F to be the set of all pro￿les of consistent and complete judgment sets on
X (universal domain), and we require the collective judgment set to be consistent and
complete (sometimes called collective rationality). These requirements, however, are not
built into the model itself and are sometimes relaxed.
An example of an aggregation rule is majority voting, where, for every pro￿le (J1;:::;Jn)
in the domain,
F(J1;:::;Jn) = fp 2 X : jfi 2 N : p 2 Jigj > n=2g.
Another example is a dictatorship, where there exists some ￿xed individual i 2 N such
that, for every pro￿le (J1;:::;Jn) in the domain,
F(J1;:::;Jn) = Ji.
Other examples will be considered later.
While all these de￿nitions should be fairly straightforward, we have glossed over a
central element of the model: the logic, which captures the notion of consistency. Gener-
ally, a logic is a non-empty set L of sentences, called propositions, that is endowed with a
negation operator : (￿ not￿ ) and a notion of consistency, according to which some subsets
of L are consistent and the others inconsistent, subject to some standard conditions.5
In standard propositional logic, for example, a set of propositions is consistent if all its
elements can be simultaneously true. Thus the set fp;q;p ! qg is consistent (where p
and q are atomic propositions) whereas the sets fp;p ! q;:qg and fp;:pg are not. In
the logic we have used to express preference aggregation problems, a set of propositions is
consistent if it does not breach the rationality conditions on preferences (such as asymme-
try, transitivity and connectedness). Thus the set fx ￿ y;y ￿ zg is consistent while the
set fx ￿ y;y ￿ z;z ￿ xg is not. We can embed feasibility constraints on individual and
collective judgments into the notion of consistency in the logic. For example, in the case
of a hiring committee, the propositions p and q might be ￿ hire Paul￿and ￿ hire Quincy￿ ,
5First, every proposition-negation pair fp;:pg ￿ L is inconsistent. Second, subsets of consistent sets
S ￿ L are consistent. Third, the empty set ; is consistent, and every consistent set S ￿ L has a consistent
superset T ￿ L containing a member of each proposition-negation pair fp;:pg ￿ L. For details, see
Dietrich [6].
5respectively. If there is only one job opening, then the set fpg is consistent while the set
fp;qg is inconsistent.
A proposition p 2 L for which neither fpg nor f:pg is inconsistent is called contingent.
For convenience, we include only contingent propositions in the agenda. Further, we say
that a set S ￿ L logically entails a proposition p 2 L, written S ‘ p, if S [ f:pg is
inconsistent. For example, in standard propositional logic, the set fp;p ! qg logically
entails the proposition q. In the logic used to express preference aggregation problems,
the set fx ￿ y;y ￿ zg entails the proposition x ￿ z. For our hiring committee with only
one opening, the proposition p logically entails :q. By substituting di⁄erent logics into
the model, we can capture a great variety of di⁄erent aggregation problems.
3 Generalizing Arrow￿ s theorem
To see how Arrow￿ s theorem generalizes from preference aggregation to aggregation prob-
lems involving other logical relationships or feasibility constraints, we will state and prove
Arrow￿ s theorem and try to translate the proof to more general settings. Although the
result is not the most elegant proof of a generalized impossibility theorem (the existing,
direct proofs fare better on that count), the aim is to learn something from the transla-
tion. First, we will see which notions in Arrow￿ s result and proof generalize easily and
what these generalizations look like. Second, where the translation leaves holes, we will see
what extra conditions are needed to ￿ll those holes. This will motivate some of the main
conditions seen in the symposium and in the judgment-aggregation literature beyond.
For our purposes, we consider Arrow￿ s theorem in the case in which all individual and
collective preferences are strict. The preference aggregation problem can then be sum-
marized as follows. Each individual i 2 N holds a preference order ￿i (an asymmetric,
transitive and connected binary relation) over a set K = fx;y;z;:::g of alternatives. We
are looking for a preference aggregation rule, F, that assigns to each pro￿le (￿1;:::;￿n)
of individual preference orders a collective preference order ￿. We require F to satisfy
universal domain (every pro￿le of strict orders is admissible as input), collective rational-
ity (the output is a strict order), independence of irrelevant alternatives (the collective
preference over any pair x;y 2 K depends only on individual preferences over that pair),
and the weak Pareto principle (if everyone prefers x to y, then x is collectively preferred
to y). Arrow￿ s theorem states that, when jKj ￿ 3, only dictatorships satisfy these con-
ditions, i.e., there is some ￿xed individual i 2 N such that, for every pro￿le (￿1;:::;￿n),
F(￿1;:::;￿n) =￿i.
The intended generalization can be motivated by reinterpreting preferences as judg-
ments on special kinds of propositions. For instance, the preference order x ￿ y ￿ z
encodes the judgments that x is preferable to y, y is preferable to z, and x is preferable to
z. More generally, any preference order encodes a set of judgments on all binary ranking
propositions of the form ￿ v is preferable to w￿ , where v and w are distinct alternatives
in K. Thus the agenda is the set X = fv ￿ w : v;w 2 K with v 6= wg. Judgment
sets here are consistent and complete when these constraints are understood in terms of
the standard constraints on preferences. This reinterpretation of preferences as judgments
on binary ranking propositions raises the prospect of proving a result similar to Arrow￿ s
theorem for more general agendas of propositions.
What do Arrow￿ s conditions on the aggregation rule look like in this general case? Uni-
6versal domain becomes the condition that every pro￿le of consistent and complete judg-
ment sets is admissible as input to the aggregation rule. Collective rationality becomes
the condition that the output is a consistent and complete judgment set. The weak Pareto
principle becomes the propositionwise unanimity principle, requiring that if everyone ac-
cepts a proposition p within the agenda, then p is collectively accepted. And independence
of irrelevant alternatives becomes the requirement ￿here called independence ￿that the
collective judgment on any proposition p within the agenda depend only on individual
judgments on p. We want to know for which agendas of propositions dictatorships are the
only aggregation rules satisfying these conditions. This question is non-trivial, since we
can easily construct agendas for which non-dictatorial aggregation rules such as majority
voting work perfectly well. A simple example is X = fp;:pg.
Let us revisit the key steps in the proof of Arrow￿ s theorem and generalize them in
turn. Throughout the proof, we assume that the aggregation rule satis￿es Arrow￿ s four
conditions, and our de￿nitions and lemmas take these conditions as given. Many classic
proofs of the theorem consist of two lemmas: the ￿ contagion￿or ￿ ￿eld-expansion￿lemma
and the ￿ group-contraction￿lemma. Both make use of the fact that, under independence
of irrelevant alternatives, a preference aggregation rule can be represented in terms of its
￿ winning coalitions￿ , as de￿ned in a moment.
3.1 The contagion or ￿eld-expansion lemma
The literature contains several versions of the ￿rst lemma, which refer to weaker or stronger
notions of ￿ decisiveness￿ . We write K￿6=K to denote the set of all ordered pairs of distinct
alternatives from K. Recall these standard de￿nitions from social choice theory.
De￿nition A group S ￿ N is called almost decisive over the ordered pair (x;y) 2
K ￿6= K if [x ￿i y for all i 2 S; and y ￿j x for all j 2 NnS] implies x ￿ y: A group that
is almost decisive over all pairs in K ￿6= K is called almost decisive. For each pair (x;y),
the set of almost decisive groups over (x;y), denoted W(x;y), is called the set of winning
coalitions over (x;y).
De￿nition A group S ￿ N is called decisive over the ordered pair (x;y) 2 K ￿6= K if
[x ￿i y for all i 2 S] implies x ￿ y: A group that is decisive over all pairs in K ￿6= K is
called decisive. If a single individual i is decisive, then i is a dictator.
The di⁄erence between these two notions is that an almost decisive group wins if
everyone outside the group opposes it, whereas a decisive group wins regardless of others￿
support or opposition. Clearly, decisiveness implies almost decisiveness, and the two
notions are equivalent if we accept the monotonicity property that more ￿ votes￿in favor
of a position cannot hurt collective acceptance of that position. Formally:
De￿nition An aggregation rule is monotonic if, for any (x;y) 2 K ￿6= K, the set of
winning coalitions is superset-closed: S ￿ T ￿ N and S 2 W(x;y) imply T 2 W(x;y).
While monotonicity is natural in almost all social-choice and judgment-aggregation set-
tings (when independence is satis￿ed), it is not always assumed and not required for
Arrow￿ s theorem.
7We can now state three standard versions of the contagion lemma.6
Lemma 1 (Contagion) If the group S ￿ N is
(a) almost decisive over some (x;y) 2 K ￿6= K, then S is almost decisive.
(b) decisive over some (x;y) 2 K ￿6= K, then S is decisive.
(c) almost decisive over some (x;y) 2 K ￿6= K, then S is decisive.
Notice that the third version is stronger in that it converts almost decisiveness into deci-
siveness. The proofs of these three claims are very similar, but it turns out that, when we
translate to general judgment-aggregation problems, small di⁄erences matter.
Proof sketch. For now, let us focus on contagion from the pair (x;y) to the pair
(x;z) for all z 2 K. Consider preference pro￿les that are consistent with Table 2 (for the
moment, ignoring the ￿rst row).
p Y :q
x ￿i y y ￿i z z ￿i x
i 2 S X X ￿
i 2 NnS ￿ X ￿
Table 2: A pro￿le in the proof of the contagion lemma
The ￿ ￿￿in the ￿rst and third columns for row ￿ i 2 NnS￿means that these preferences
have not yet been speci￿ed. That is, everyone prefers y to z, and everyone in S prefers
x to y and x to z. By independence, the collective preference between x and z can only
depend on individual preferences over this pair.
Towards showing (a): Suppose that S is almost decisive over (x;y) but not almost
decisive over (x;z). Then, since everyone in S prefers x to z, if everyone in NnS prefers z
to x, z must also be collectively preferred to x. But consider pro￿les in which everyone in
NnS has preferences y ￿i z ￿i x (that is, their row reads [￿;X;X]). In this case, since S
is almost decisive on (x;y), x is collectively preferred to y; and since everyone prefers y to
z, y is collectively preferred to z, by the weak Pareto principle. Therefore, by transitivity,
x is collectively preferred to z, a contradiction.
Towards showing (b): Suppose that S is decisive over (x;y) but not decisive over (x;z).
Then, since everyone in S prefers x to z, there must exist a combination of preferences
over x and z for those in NnS such that z is collectively preferred to x. But consider
pro￿les in which all those i 2 NnS with preference z ￿i x (as before) have preferences
y ￿i z ￿i x (their row reads [￿;X;X]); and all those i 2 NnS with preference x ￿i z have
preferences x ￿i y ￿i z (their row reads [X;X;￿]). In this case, since S is decisive on
(x;y), x is collectively preferred to y; and since everyone prefers y to z, y is collectively
preferred to z, by the weak Pareto principle. Therefore, by transitivity, x is collectively
preferred to z, a contradiction.
Towards showing (c): Suppose that S is almost decisive over (x;y) but not decisive
over (x;z). Then, since everyone in S prefers x to z, there must exist a combination
6The ￿rst of these used to be in the standard textbook proof. For example, it is the version in Mas-
Colell et al. [39]. The second emerged in Sen [59] and is now perhaps standard. For example, it is used in
Campbell and Kelly￿ s chapter on Arrovian impossibility theorems in the Handbook of Social Choice and
Welfare [4]. The third, stronger version comes from the classic treatment in Sen [58].
8of preferences over x and z for those in NnS such that z is collectively preferred to x.
But consider pro￿les in which all those i 2 NnS with preference z ￿i x (as before) have
preferences y ￿i z ￿i x (their row reads [￿;X;X]); and all those i 2 NnS with preference
x ￿i z have preferences y ￿i x ￿i z (their row reads [￿;X;￿]). In this case, since S is
almost decisive on (x;y), x is collectively preferred to y; and since everyone prefers y to
z, y is collectively preferred to z, by the weak Pareto principle. Therefore, by transitivity,
x is collectively preferred to z, a contradiction.
Similar steps show contagion from the pair (x;y) to the pair (w;y) for all w 2 X; and
putting these and similar steps together yields the desired conclusions. ￿
3.2 Generalizing the contagion lemma
Let us deconstruct this proof, translate each piece to a general judgment-aggregation set-
ting, and see if we arrive at the building blocks of an analogous lemma. Following our
assumption in the case of preferences, we assume that the judgment aggregation rule satis-
￿es the generalized versions of Arrow￿ s four conditions; again, our de￿nitions and lemmas
take these conditions as given. First let us translate the notions of decisiveness. As in
the case of preference aggregation, any judgment aggregation rule satisfying independence
can be represented in terms of its winning coalitions.
De￿nition A group S ￿ N is called almost decisive over the proposition p 2 X if [p 2 Ji
for all i 2 S; and p = 2 Ji for all j 2 NnS] implies p 2 F(J1;:::;Jn): A group that is almost
decisive over all propositions in X is called almost decisive. For each p, the set of almost
decisive groups over p, denoted Wp, is called the set of winning coalitions over p.
De￿nition A group S ￿ N is called decisive over the proposition p 2 X if [p 2 Ji for
all i 2 S] implies p 2 F(J1;:::;Jn): A group that is decisive over all propositions in X is
called decisive. If a single individual i is decisive, then i is a dictator.
We will highlight three pieces of the argument.
(1) Conditional entailment. In each of (a), (b) and (c), we ￿ leveraged￿a collective
preference for x over y to a collective preference for x over z using unanimity about
(y;z) as the fulcrum. This works because, conditional on a collective preference for y
over z, a collective preference for x over y entails a collective preference for x over z,
since the converse, z ￿ x, would be inconsistent with transitivity. Intransitivity is the
main notion of inconsistency in preference-aggregation settings. But we can translate the
notion of conditional entailment to any judgment-aggregation setting using that setting￿ s
own notion of what is inconsistent or infeasible. Indeed, something close to the following
notion is found in most papers in the symposium.
De￿nition Proposition p conditionally entails proposition q, written p ‘￿ q, if there
is a (possibly empty) subset Y of the agenda X such that fpg [ Y [ f:qg is a minimal
inconsistent set and (for non-triviality) p 6= :q.7
7Recall that an inconsistent set is minimal if every proper subset is consistent. This implies that
replacing any individual proposition in the set with its negation produces a consistent set. In particular,
in this case, this means that the conditioning set Y is consistent with p alone and with :q alone.
9In the setting above, the minimal inconsistent set consists of p := (x ￿ y), Y := (y ￿ z)
and :q := (z ￿ x), or [X;X;X] in Table 2. Thus, p conditionally entails q: Given unanim-
ity on (y ￿ z), if (x ￿ y) is collectively accepted, then (x ￿ z) must also be collectively
accepted. More generally, Y need not be singleton but could be another set of propositions
(possibly even empty). In the example from our opening section, p := ￿ CO2 emissions are
above a given threshold￿ , Y := ￿ if CO2 emissions are above that threshold, then there will
be a critical temperature increase￿ , and :q := ￿ there will not be a critical temperature
increase￿ . Here, again, p conditionally entails q: Given unanimity about the temperature-
increasing e⁄ects of emissions above the threshold, if the panel judges that emissions are
above that threshold, then it must also judge that there will be a temperature increase.
Thus, in general settings, if p entails q conditional on some (possibly empty) set of
propositions Y , we can always leverage a collective judgment in support of p to a collective
judgment in support of q using unanimous acceptance of every proposition in Y as the
fulcrum (see the top row of Table 2, where a X in the Y column is read as acceptance of
every proposition in Y ).
(2) Using consistent individual pro￿les to obtain a contradiction. Each lever-
age argument involved constructing particular pro￿les of individual preferences and using
these to obtain a contradiction. In particular, we constructed pro￿les for those individuals
outside the group S over (x;y) and (x;z). For this step to work, the constructed prefer-
ences had to be consistent (in particular, with the assumed unanimous preference for y
over z). For part (a), we used the preferences y ￿i z ￿i x, or [￿;X;X], for all in NnS. For
(b), we used these preferences again and also x ￿i y ￿i z, or [X;X;￿]. These were both
consistent preferences. In fact, in both cases, the constructed preferences di⁄ered from
the relevant minimal inconsistent set [X;X;X] (the preference cycle) in just one place.
The analogous argument in a general setting requires constructing pro￿les of individual
judgments concerning p and :q where there is unanimity about every proposition in Y ,
and where fpg [ Y [ f:qg is a minimal inconsistent set (again, see the top row of Table
2). For parts (a) and (b), the analogous constructed judgments for NnS, [￿;X;X] and
[X;X;￿], will again di⁄er from the minimal inconsistent set, [X;X;X], in just one place
and hence, by minimality, they too must be consistent.
In part (c), however, we used the preferences y ￿i x ￿i z, or [￿;X;￿], to obtain
a contradiction. This di⁄ers from the relevant minimal inconsistent set [X;X;X] in two
places. In the preference case, this was consistent, but in the general case, this step will
only translate if the relevant minimal inconsistent set, fpg [ Y [ f:qg, has the property
that the ￿ pair-negated￿variant f:pg [ Y [ fqg is itself consistent. More generally:
De￿nition A minimal inconsistent set Y 0 is pair-negatable if it has a subset of size two,
say fp0;q0g ￿ Y 0, such that (Y 0nfp0;q0g) [ f:p0;:q0g is consistent.8 In our proof, p0 = p
and q0 = :q.
In the preference example above, p0 := (x ￿ y), Y 0nfp0;q0g := (y ￿ z), q0 := (z ￿ x), and
(Y 0nfp0;q0g) [ f:p0;:q0g can be summarized by the preferences y ￿i x ￿i z. Thus the
minimal inconsistent set de￿ned by the preference cycle is indeed pair-negatable.
Recall that part (c) of the lemma is not needed if the aggregation rule is assumed
to satisfy monotonicity (since, then, almost decisiveness and decisiveness are equivalent).
8In general, the set Y
0nfp
0;q
0g could be empty.
10But without assuming monotonicity, to obtain decisiveness from almost decisiveness (i.e.,
to obtain monotonicity), we need to assume the existence of at least one pair-negatable
minimal inconsistent subset of the agenda. Indeed, all of the impossibility results in this
symposium that do not impose monotonicity assume a condition close to this.9
Thus, in general settings, if p entails q conditional on some Y ￿ X, and S is almost
decisive (respectively decisive) on p, then S is almost decisive (respectively decisive) on q.
If, in addition, f:pg[Y [fqg is consistent, then S￿ s almost decisiveness on p implies S￿ s
decisiveness on q.
(3) Connectedness and Total Blockedness. The last piece of the proof of the
lemma involved repeating the leverage step using other potential inconsistencies with tran-
sitivity. For example, the potential cycle w ￿ x, x ￿ y and y ￿ w is used to leverage
a collective preference for x over y to one for w over y using unanimity about (w;x) as
the fulcrum. Eventually this process reaches every ordered pair (w;z) 2 K ￿6= K. If we
translate the argument to a general judgment-aggregation setting, we ￿nd that, just as
a virus spreads from one individual to another along a network of infectious contacts, a
group￿ s decisiveness on some proposition p spreads to all other propositions that can be
reached from p via a sequence of conditional entailments. That is, a group￿ s decisiveness
travels across a directed graph of propositions connected by conditional entailments, each
associated with an appropriate minimal inconsistent set. Thus, the last extra condition
needed to extend the contagion lemma to a general setting is that this directed graph is
(strongly) connected: The pattern of minimal inconsistent subsets of the agenda is such
that we can travel from any proposition to any other via a sequence of conditional entail-
ments. Indeed, this condition, introduced by Nehring and Puppe [47, 49], or something
close to it is found in all the symposium papers establishing impossibility results.
De￿nition An agenda X is totally blocked (sometimes also called path-connected) if,
for any pair of propositions p;q 2 X, there exists a sequence of propositions p1,...,pk 2 X
such that p = p1 ‘￿ p2 ‘￿ ::: ‘￿ pk = q.
Putting these translated pieces of the argument back together, using the two new
conditions we have discovered, yields a new general contagion lemma.
Lemma 2 (General contagion) Suppose that the agenda is totally blocked. Then, if
the group S ￿ N is:
(a) almost decisive over some proposition p in the agenda, then S is almost decisive;
(b) decisive over some proposition p in the agenda, then S is decisive.
(c) almost decisive over some proposition p in the agenda and, in addition, the agenda
has at least one pair-negatable minimal inconsistent subset, then S is decisive.
Proof sketch. For parts (a) and (b), the proof follows from the discussion above.
For part (c), let S be almost decisive over some p. By (a), S is almost decisive over all
propositions, including those that form a pair-negatable minimal inconsistent set (which
9This is equivalent to the existence of an even-negatable minimal inconsistent subset of the agenda (i.e.,
which has a subset of even size whose propositionwise negation makes the set consistent), introduced in
Dietrich [6] and Dietrich and List [9], and also to the algebraic condition of non-a¢ neness, introduced in
Dokow and Holzman [23] in this symposium.
11must exist by assumption). Therefore, there exists at least one proposition over which S
is decisive. By part (b), S is decisive. ￿
This lemma has a couple of corollaries of independent interest. First, the lemma as
a whole tells us that if the agenda is totally blocked and has at least one pair-negatable
minimal inconsistent subset, then the aggregation rule is monotonic. Second, part (a) on
its own tells us that if an agenda is totally blocked, then the aggregation rule is neutral in
the sense that it aggregates judgments on each proposition in the same way.
De￿nition A judgment aggregation rule is neutral if, for all propositions in the agenda,
the set of winning coalitions is the same: Wp = Wq for all p;q 2 X. The strengthening of
independence by imposing neutrality is called systematicity.
A similar de￿nition also applies to the case of preferences, with propositions replaced by
ordered pairs of distinct alternatives.
3.3 The group-contraction lemma
We can now turn to the second lemma used to prove Arrow￿ s theorem. It too comes in
several forms, but we will just need one.10
Lemma 3 (Group contraction) Suppose the aggregation rule is neutral.
Then there exists an individual who is almost decisive over some ordered pair (x;y) 2
K ￿6= K.
Proof sketch. Suppose not. We already know that there exist almost decisive groups;
e.g., N is such a group, by the weak Pareto principle. Among all groups that are almost
decisive over some pair, let S be among the smallest. Let (y;z) be a pair over which S is
almost decisive. Fix some j 2 S and consider preference pro￿les that are consistent with
Table 3 (for now, ignoring the ￿rst row).
p Y :q
x ￿i y y ￿i z z ￿i x
i = j X X ￿
i 2 Snfjg ￿ X X
i 2 NnS X ￿ X
Table 3: A pro￿le in the proof of the group-contraction lemma
The groups NnS and Snfjg could be empty. Since Snfjg is smaller than S, it cannot
be almost decisive over (x;y), and thus x must be collectively preferred to y. Since S is
almost decisive on (y;z), y must be collectively preferred to z. Thus, by transitivity, x
must be collectively preferred to z, and hence j is almost decisive on (x;z). ￿
The combination of the two lemmas yields Arrow￿ s theorem: From part (a) of the
contagion lemma, we know that the aggregation rule is neutral. The group-contraction
lemma then implies the existence of an almost decisive individual on some pair in K￿6=K.
By part (c) of the contagion lemma, this individual is decisive over all pairs and hence a
dictator. ￿
10This version is essentially the one in Sen [58].
123.4 Generalizing the group-contraction lemma
Again, let us try to translate this proof to a general judgment-aggregation setting. Once
again, the proof relies on conditional entailments (in fact, the same conditional entailment
as before) and on constructing consistent pro￿les of individual preferences to induce a con-
tradiction. A quick inspection of Table 3 con￿rms that each of the individual preferences
used in the construction di⁄er from the relevant minimal inconsistent set, [X;X;X], in
just one place. Thus, by the same argument as used above, the analogous pro￿le of indi-
vidual judgments (see the top row of the table) will be consistent. There is, however, one
slightly hidden assumption. Unlike in the proof of the general contagion lemma, the min-
imal inconsistent set used here needs to have three elements: If Y were empty and fp;:qg
were itself a minimal inconsistent set, then the judgments held by the individuals in NnS
would be inconsistent. Therefore, the analogous lemma requires the following additional
property on the agenda (which, it is easy to check, is implied by total blockedness).
De￿nition An agenda X is non-simple if it has a minimal inconsistent subset with three
or more elements.
Adding this extra condition yields the following straightforward generalization of the
group contraction lemma.
Lemma 4 (General group contraction) Suppose that the agenda is non-simple and
the aggregation rule is neutral. Then there exists an individual who is almost decisive over
some proposition p.
The proof follows immediately from the discussion above.
3.5 The theorem
We can now state the analogue of Arrow￿ s theorem in judgment aggregation.
Theorem 1 (a) If the agenda is totally blocked and has at least one pair-negatable min-
imal inconsistent subset, the only aggregation rules satisfying universal domain, con-
sistency and completeness, the unanimity principle and independence are the dicta-
torships.
(b) If the agenda does not have both of these properties and jNj ￿ 3, there exist non-
dictatorial aggregation rules satisfying the speci￿ed conditions.
Proof sketch. Part (a) follows immediately from the general contagion and contrac-
tion lemmas. Its converse (b) (for jNj ￿ 3) is established through explicit examples, as
shown in Nehring and Puppe [49] (for the violation of total blockedness) and Dokow and
Holzman [23] (for the violation of the pair-negatability property). ￿
The literature contains several variants of this theorem. Dokow and Holzman [23], in
this symposium, proved both parts. Part (a) alone was also proved by Dietrich and List
[9]. Both of these works build on Nehring and Puppe￿ s earlier variant [49], also in this
symposium, in which monotonicity is additionally imposed on the aggregation rule but
the agenda condition of pair-negatability is not required. Recall that, with monotonicity,
13almost decisiveness implies decisiveness, and hence part (c) of the general contagion lemma
is not needed. Nehring and Puppe [49] and Dietrich and List [9] further considered the
case in which the aggregation rule is required to be neutral (i.e., independence is strength-
ened to systematicity). Here total blockedness can be weakened to non-simplicity and the
general contagion lemma is not needed (apart from a variant of part (c) in the case with-
out monotonicity, to get from almost decisiveness to decisiveness, using pair-negatability).
Interestingly, with neutrality, the unanimity principle becomes largely redundant.11 Pre-
cursors of the result with neutrality, under more restrictive agenda assumptions, include
the impossibility results by List and Pettit [36] and Pauly and van Hees [52].12
The two lemmas underlying the proof above can be found in various places in this
symposium and elsewhere. In essence, part (a) of the general contagion lemma occurs in
Dokow and Holzman [23] and Dietrich and List [9], and an adapted version also occurs
in Dietrich and Mongin￿ s symposium paper [20], discussed below. The conclusion of part
(b) is similar to that of Nehring and Puppe￿ s contagion lemma [49], but the argument is
di⁄erent. They use what they call the ￿ intersection property￿ , whereas the proof above
can be traced back to classical social choice theory. The conclusion of part (c) and its use
of pair-negatability can also be found in Dokow and Holzman [23] and Dietrich and List
[9], though they each give a separate argument that the pair-negatability property (￿ non-
a¢ neness￿in Dokow and Holzman) yields monotonicity of the aggregation rule. However,
part (c) in the present form, deriving full decisiveness from almost decisiveness on a single
proposition, is not commonly used in the judgment-aggregation literature.
The general group-contraction lemma essentially occurs in Dokow and Holzman [23].
Other papers, including Dietrich and List [9] and Dietrich and Mongin [20], replace it
by a two-step argument proving, ￿rst, that the set of winning coalitions is intersection-
closed and, secondly, that the intersection of all winning coalitions is singleton. This proof
strategy resembles those proofs of Arrow￿ s theorem which show that the set of winning
coalitions forms an ￿ ultra-￿lter￿ .13 We return to this point when we discuss relaxations of
the completeness requirement on collective judgments.
How demanding are the agenda conditions of Theorem 1? Total blockedness turns
out to be quite strong. While it is paradigmatically satis￿ed by the agenda of pairwise
preference rankings over three or more alternatives, some of our other illustrative agendas
violate it. In the law-court example, where p and q are the premises for liability and r
is the proposition about liability (subject to r $ (p ^ q)), total blockedness is violated
(e.g., there is no sequence of conditional entailments from the proposition that he did
not do it to the proposition that he is liable). Indeed, unanimity voting on each of p,
q and r (with :p;:q and :r being the ￿ default￿judgments in the absence of unanimity)
satis￿es all of the Arrovian conditions. In the expert-panel example, where the agenda
consists of p, p ! q, q and their negations, total blockedness is again violated, and a
non-dictatorial aggregation rule satisfying the speci￿ed conditions is given by accepting p
if it is unanimously accepted and accepting each of p ! q and q unless it is unanimously
11In the neutral case, even without the unanimity principle, the other conditions imply either (i) dicta-
torship ￿when the agenda has at least one inconsistent subset whose propositionwise negation is consistent
(Dietrich [6]) ￿or (ii) the disjunction of dictatorship and inverse dictatorship (Dietrich and List [9]).
12Under stronger agenda assumptions, Pauly and van Hees [52] and Dietrich [5] also proved impossibility
results without neutrality in which the unanimity principle is weakened to the requirement that the ag-
gregation rule be non-constant. For other discussions of the relationship between preference and judgment
aggregation, see also List and Pettit [37] and Nehring [43].
13See, for example, Campbell and Kelly [4] and references therein.
14rejected (with ￿ default￿judgments :p, p ! q and q otherwise).
However, despite the demandingness of total blockedness, we can gain important in-
sights from the role played by conditional entailments in making decisiveness contagious.
In particular, whenever we can get from p to q via a sequence of conditional entailments,
any winning coalition for p must also be winning for q; and, further, whenever the agenda
contains a strongly connected segment, the aggregation rule must be neutral within that
segment. In this way, the structure of conditional entailments within the agenda severely
restricts the class of admissible aggregation rules, sometimes forcing them to be locally
dictatorial, oligarchic or subject to individual veto power. Many of these results, along
with a general family of ￿ blockedness￿conditions, are in Nehring and Puppe [49] in this
symposium. See also Nehring [44] and Dietrich and List [15].
The pair-negatability property is interpretationally less demanding than total blocked-
ness. It is satis￿ed in all of the examples above, and the only agendas violating it are those
that are essentially isomorphic to a set of propositions in standard propositional logic
whose only logical connectives are negation (:) and material bi-implication ($) (Dokow
and Holzman [23]). For such agendas, the so-called ￿ parity rules￿ , which accept any propo-
sition if and only if it is accepted by an odd number of individuals (in an odd-sized subset
of N), are the only aggregation rules satisfying the Arrovian conditions.
Conditions
(plus universal domain,
consistency & completeness)
Unanimity principle
Unanimity principle
& monotonicity
Independence
totally blocked
& pair-negatable
totally blocked
Independence
& neutrality
non-simple
& pair-negatable
non-simple
Table 4: Agendas for which only dictatorships are possible
Table 4 summarizes the theorem￿ s main variants we have commented on. The rows and
columns indicate the conditions imposed on the aggregation rule, and the corresponding
entries show the classes of agendas for which any such rule must be a dictatorship.
4 Escape routes from impossibility
As noted in our opening remarks, the most important contribution of the impossibility re-
sults on judgment aggregation, as in preference aggregation, is not so much to demonstrate
that there are no compelling aggregation rules, but to give us insights into which require-
ments on aggregation must be relaxed to ￿nd such rules. The generalization of Arrow￿ s
theorem points to four di⁄erent escape routes from the impossibility of non-dictatorial
judgment aggregation.
The ￿rst three correspond to the three types of constraints on aggregation mentioned
at the beginning. We can restrict the domain of admissible inputs to the aggregation rule;
relax the constraints on the outputs; or weaken the informational restrictions imposed by
independence (we set aside the less compelling route of dropping ￿ democratic￿conditions
such as the unanimity principle or monotonicity). The fourth route uses the fact that,
unlike Arrow￿ s theorem, which applies to all non-trivial preference aggregation problems
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of substantive interest. We can thus focus on agendas that are substantively interesting but
fall outside the ￿ problematic￿classes leading to dictatorship. While the ￿rst three routes
generalize familiar responses to Arrow￿ s theorem, the last exploits the additional structure
that can be introduced by the move from preference aggregation to judgment-aggregation
settings.
4.1 Restricting the domain
The impossibility theorem we have discussed takes the aggregation rule to be de￿ned on
the domain of all pro￿les of consistent and complete judgment sets and thus places no
restriction on the admissible disagreement between individuals. However, it is sometimes
reasonable to expect individual judgments to fall into a more restricted domain, which cap-
tures greater agreement or cohesion among individuals. The symposium paper by Dietrich
and List [16], building on List [32], asks whether there are plausible domain restrictions
that guarantee that propositionwise majority judgments are consistent. Dietrich and List
identify several such restrictions, which can be partially ordered by strength. They are
similar in spirit to some classic domain restrictions in preference aggregation (such as
single-peakedness) and generalize some of them, thereby shedding light on which abstract
features of those classic conditions are responsible for their e⁄ects on majority consistency.
We here review some examples, beginning with the ￿rst and strongest domain-restriction
condition in judgment aggregation, called unidimensional alignment (List [32]). It is based
on the idea that judgments are constrained by the individuals￿location on some left-right
axis, which represents their positions on some cognitive or normative dimension. A pro￿le
(J1;:::;Jn) is unidimensionally aligned if the individuals in N can be ordered from left to
right such that, for every proposition p in the agenda, the individuals accepting p (i.e.,
those with p 2 Ji) are either all to the left, or all to the right, of those rejecting it (i.e.,
those with p = 2 Ji). For example, consider the agenda containing the following propositions
and their negations:
p: ￿ A budget de￿cit is acceptable.￿
q: ￿ We should increase defense spending.￿
p ! q: ￿ If a budget de￿cit is acceptable, we should increase defense spending.￿
Plausibly, individuals on the left of the political spectrum ￿nd a budget de￿cit accept-
able, while those on the right do not; those on the right endorse an increase in defense
spending, while those on the left do not; and everyone from the center to the right shares
the view that, at least conditional on the acceptability of a budget de￿cit, defense spend-
ing should be increased. The result is a unidimensionally aligned pro￿le, as illustrated in
Table 5.
Ind. 1 Ind. 2 Ind. 3 Ind. 4 Ind. 5
p X X ￿ ￿ ￿
p ! q ￿ ￿ X X X
q ￿ ￿ ￿ X X
Table 5: A unidimensionally aligned pro￿le
When this condition is satis￿ed, any proposition in the agenda is accepted by a ma-
jority if and only if it is accepted by the median individual on the given left-right order
16(ignoring ties). Thus, in the present example, the majority judgments coincide with those
of individual 3. But then the majority judgments inherit the consistency of the median
individual￿ s judgments, given individual consistency. Applied to binary preference rank-
ings, unidimensional alignment reduces to the established condition of order-restriction
(Rothstein [55]), which has single-crossing as a special case.
Dietrich and List [16] generalize this condition in several ways. They also show that
the left-right order of individuals producing the required acceptance-rejection patterns
need not be the same for all propositions in the agenda, but can vary across di⁄erent sub-
agendas. For instance, majority judgments are also consistent if the individual judgments
restricted to the propositions in each minimal inconsistent subset of the agenda (and their
negations) are unidimensionally aligned. This ￿ localization￿of the domain restrictions
resembles a familiar move in preference aggregation, where Condorcet cycles are already
ruled out by requiring restrictions such as single-peakedness to hold for every triple of
alternatives.
In preference aggregation, majority consistency can also be assured by a weaker local
condition known as value-restriction (Sen [57]): In every triple of alternatives, the indi-
viduals unanimously rank one alternative not top, not middle, or not bottom. Dietrich
and List show how to generalize this condition to judgment aggregation and give it an
alternative form: Any minimal inconsistent set Y ￿ X contains a pair of propositions p;q
not jointly accepted by anyone. To see why this generalizes Sen￿ s condition, notice that if
everyone agrees, for instance, that y is not middle among x, y and z, no-one will jointly
accept x ￿ y and y ￿ z. While weaker than the earlier domain-restriction conditions, this
is still su¢ cient for majority consistency: If the majority judgments were inconsistent,
at least one minimal inconsistent set Y ￿ X would have to be majority-accepted. But
then the pair of propositions p;q 2 Y from the de￿nition of value-restriction would be
majority-accepted as well, and at least one individual i 2 N would have to accept both,
contradicting value-restriction.
Whether value-restriction can be relaxed further depends on whether we wish to for-
mulate domain restrictions as constraints on admissible individual judgment sets or as con-
straints on admissible pro￿les. In the former case (￿ product domains￿ ), value-restriction
cannot generally be relaxed further. In the latter case (￿ non-product domains￿ ), a weaker
necessary and su¢ cient condition for majority consistency can be given. Unlike unidi-
mensional alignment or value-restriction, it speci￿es not only which patterns within each
individual￿ s judgment set are or are not permitted to occur, but also how often those pat-
terns may occur across the pro￿le: For every minimal inconsistent subset of the agenda, at
least one proposition must be majority-rejected, the veri￿cation of which requires explicit
counting.
4.2 Relaxing the constraints on the outputs
Instead of restricting the domain of inputs to the aggregation rule, we can also relax
the constraints on its outputs. The impossibility theorem above requires the aggregation
rule to generate a complete, not just consistent, collective judgment set for every pro￿le
of individual judgment sets. But there are many contexts in which completeness seems
too much to ask of collective judgments; we may be able to agree or at least resolve our
disagreements on some issues while agreeing to disagree on others.
Two natural kinds of aggregation rules violating completeness are unanimity rules and
17supermajority rules (List and Pettit [36]).14 The former accept any proposition (likewise,
its negation) collectively if and only if it is accepted by all individuals; the latter, if and only
if it is accepted by a su¢ ciently large supermajority, such as two thirds, three quarters, or
more. In both cases, no judgment is made when neither the proposition nor its negation
receives the required support. An important di⁄erence between the two kinds of rules
lies in the rationality conditions on collective judgments they secure. Notice that when
a judgment set is consistent and complete, it is also deductively closed: Any proposition
in the agenda that is logically entailed by the given judgment set is also contained in
it. In the expert-panel example, the set fp;p ! q;qg is deductively closed, while the set
fp;p ! qg is not. Accordingly, when we relax completeness, we must choose whether or
not to preserve deductive closure. Since the intersection of several deductively closed sets
of propositions is still deductively closed, unanimity rules guarantee deductive closure;
supermajority rules do not.
Philosophers are divided on whether deductive closure is a reasonable requirement of
rationality. On the one hand, the acceptance of any given set of propositions may be taken
to commit someone to the acceptance of its implications. On the other hand, it may be
computationally di¢ cult to identify these implications, and the evidential support avail-
able for any set of propositions need not carry over to its implications. In the case of strict
preference rankings, the conjunction of consistency and deductive closure is equivalent to
the conjunction of asymmetry and transitivity, and consistency by itself is equivalent to
acyclicity.
Dokow and Holzman [24], in this symposium, and Dietrich and List [13] investigate
the general case in which completeness is dropped but deductive closure is preserved,
strengthening related results by G￿rdenfors [26]. The key ￿nding is that the dictatorship
result discussed above then turns into an oligarchy result. If (and, for jNj ￿ 3, only if)
the agenda is totally blocked and has at least one pair-negatable minimal inconsistent
subset, the only aggregation rules generating consistent and deductively closed collective
judgments and satisfying Theorem 1￿ s other conditions are the oligarchies: There exists
a ￿xed non-empty subset M ￿ N such that, for every pro￿le (J1;:::;Jn) in the domain,
F(J1;:::;Jn) =
T
i2M
Ji. Unanimity rules are the limiting cases in which the set of ￿ oligarchs￿
M contains everyone. Dictatorships are the opposite limiting cases in which M is singleton.
To see why this oligarchy result holds, notice that the general contagion lemma above
continues to hold even under the present weakening of the output constraints. In partic-
ular, the aggregation rule is still neutral and monotonic under the given conditions (i.e.,
the set of winning coalitions is the same across the agenda and superset-closed). The
group-contraction lemma, by contrast, ceases to hold and must be replaced by another
argument. As in the ultra-￿lter proofs of Arrow￿ s theorem, the set of winning coalitions
can be shown to be intersection-closed. However, without completeness, the intersection
of all winning coalitions need no longer be singleton, but can be a larger set M ￿ N,
which consists precisely of the oligarchs. When applied to binary preference rankings, this
oligarchy theorem becomes a variant of Gibbard￿ s classic oligarchy result for the case of
quasi-transitive collective preferences (see Sen [58]). Dokow and Holzman [24] and Diet-
rich and List [13] show further that this oligarchy result continues to hold if completeness
is weakened to deductive closure not only on the output side but also on the input side of
14A third kind is given by the ￿ conclusion-based￿rules that deliver judgments only on conclusions, but
not on premises.
18the aggregation rule.
If we give up deductive closure, non-oligarchic possibilities open up. For example,
let each proposition in the agenda be collectively accepted whenever it is accepted by
a supermajority of more than k￿1
k of the individuals, where k is the size of the largest
minimal inconsistent subset of the agenda. The resulting collective judgments are always
consistent (Dietrich and List [10], extending List and Pettit [36]). The reason is that
k or fewer supermajorities of this size must have a non-empty intersection, and so the
supermajority judgments on any set of k or fewer propositions inherit their consistency
from the judgments of the individuals in this intersection. Thus no minimal inconsistent
set, and by implication no other inconsistent set, can be accepted.
Supermajority rules implement di⁄erent criteria for the acceptance and the rejection of
each proposition; it is harder to accept a proposition than to reject it. Dietrich and List [19]
show that such an asymmetry is necessary for the avoidance of dictatorship, even when the
only requirement on judgment sets is consistency. Whenever the agenda is non-simple and
cannot be partitioned into two logically independent sub-agendas, the only aggregation
rules mapping pro￿les of consistent individual judgments to consistent collective ones
satisfying a condition of acceptance-rejection neutrality (requiring symmetrical treatment
of acceptance and rejection of each proposition) are dictatorships.15
4.3 Relaxing independence
A third escape-route from impossibility is to relax propositionwise independence. In prefer-
ence aggregation, independence of irrelevant alternatives is usually defended by appealing
to strategy-proofness. A defense of independence by appealing to non-manipulability can
also be given in some judgment-aggregation settings (Dietrich and List [11], Nehring and
Puppe [47, 49]). But even when we ignore strategic issues, we usually want a court￿ s
collective judgment on the factual question of whether the defendant did it to be indepen-
dent of individuals￿judgments on the legal question of whether he was obliged not to do
it. However, it seems less natural (on normative or, absent cynicism, strategic grounds)
to require the court￿ s collective judgment on the defendant￿ s liability to be independent
of the individuals￿judgments on whether he did it or whether he was obliged not to. If
we relax independence, several interesting classes of aggregation rules become available.
The most widely discussed one, the class of premise-based rules, is the topic of Dietrich
and Mongin￿ s symposium paper [20]. These rules go back, under the name issue-by-issue
voting, to Kornhauser and Sager￿ s work in a legal context [30, 31, 29], where they were
contrasted with conclusion-based rules, or case-by-case voting, and more formally to List
and Pettit [36], Bovens and Rabinowicz [2], Dietrich [5] and others.
The basic idea is to designate a subset of the agenda as a set of premises and to
aggregate judgments on them by some propositionwise independent rule, but to allow the
collective judgments on all other propositions (the conclusions) to depend on the resulting
collective judgments on these premises. In the court setting, the issues of whether he did
it and whether he ought not to have done it might be thought of as the premises, and we
might decide these, for example, by majority voting. The issue of liability might be thought
of as the conclusion, and we might decide this, for example, by the rule that the defendant
is liable if and only if we collectively judge that he did it and ought not to have done
15Acceptance-rejection neutrality is related to neutrality within issues or unbiasedness, discussed in
Nehring and Puppe [49] in this symposium and Dietrich and List [18].
19so. (Conclusion-based rules, by contrast, apply a propositionwise independent aggregation
rule directly on the conclusions.) Earlier contributions have usually assumed logically
independent premises ￿ideally chosen so as to constitute a logical basis for the entire
agenda, so that their adjudication settles all other propositions ￿and have focused mainly
on majority voting on these premises. Dietrich and Mongin [20] generalize the notion of a
premise-based aggregation rule by de￿ning it in terms of two properties: propositionwise
independence restricted to the premises and unanimity preservation also restricted to the
premises. This permits, among other things, logically interdependent premises.
Dietrich and Mongin use this framework to generalize the so-called doctrinal paradox,
the fact that premise-based and conclusion-based rules can deliver di⁄erent outcomes. Just
as Dietrich and Mongin de￿ne premise-based rules in terms of two weak properties, they
de￿ne conclusion-based rules in terms of the weak requirement of unanimity preservation
on all non-premises. Putting these two de￿nitions together, they identify the class of
agendas for which premise-based and conclusion-based aggregation are in con￿ ict, i.e., for
which only dictatorships meet both requirements (under universal domain, consistency
and completeness). The identi￿ed agenda conditions generalize the agenda conditions of
Theorem 1 and reduce to them when the premise set is the entire agenda. The bottom
line is that, in many contexts, to solve the doctrinal paradox one must choose between
privileging premises and privileging conclusions. Earlier related results were given by
Mongin [42] and Nehring [45].
Another class of aggregation rules that give up independence is the class of sequential
priority rules (List [33]). Any such rule is de￿ned relative to a particular order of priority
among the propositions in the agenda X. For each pro￿le (J1;:::;Jn), the propositions in
X are then considered one-by-one in the speci￿ed order and the collective judgment on
each proposition p is made as follows. If the majority judgment on p (or the judgment
made by some other propositionwise criterion) is consistent with the collective judgments
on propositions considered earlier, then that judgment becomes the collective judgment
on p; but if it is inconsistent with those earlier judgments, then the collective judgment
on p is determined by the implications of those earlier judgments. In the expert-panel
example of Table 1 above, the propositions might be considered in the order p, p ! q,
q (with negations interspersed), which would lead to the acceptance of p and p ! q by
majority voting and the acceptance of q by logical inference.
Just as the collective judgments produced by any premise-based rule depend on which
propositions are chosen as the premises, the collective judgments produced by a sequen-
tial priority rule depend on the order in which propositions are considered. Sometimes
there may be a natural choice of premises, or a natural order of priority, as in the court
example, but often there can be reasonable disagreement about which propositions should
be considered prior to others. The problem of majority inconsistency thus resurfaces as a
problem of path-dependence (List [33]).
A third class of aggregation rules that are possible without independence is the class
of distance-based rules (Pigozzi [54], Miller and Osherson [41]), originally introduced in
the area of belief merging in computer science (Konieczny and Pino PØrez [28]). Any
such rule is de￿ned relative to a particular distance metric between judgment sets. An
example is the Hamming distance, which de￿nes the distance between any two judgment
sets J;J0 ￿ X as the number of propositions in the agenda on which J and J0 disagree,
i.e., d(J;J0) = jfp 2 X : p 2 J < p 2 J0gj. The aggregation rule then maps each
pro￿le (J1;:::;Jn) to a consistent and complete collective judgment set J that minimizes
20the total distance from the individual judgment sets,
P
i2N
d(J;Ji). Distance-based rules
capture the idea of reaching a compromise between di⁄erent individuals￿judgment sets. If
the Hamming distance is used, they further have the property of delivering the majority
judgments whenever these are consistent. Applied to binary preference rankings, this
Hamming rule reduces to what is known as the Kemeny rule.
To analyze the possibilities opened up by relaxing independence more systematically,
Dietrich [7] introduces a condition of independence of irrelevant information de￿ned in
terms of a relevance relation between propositions. An aggregation rule satis￿es this con-
dition if and only if the collective judgment on each proposition depends only on individual
judgments on propositions deemed ￿ relevant￿to it. The condition reduces to the standard
independence condition when each proposition is deemed relevant only to itself, but, for
example, the kind of dependency structure we ￿nd in premise-based rules can also be
captured: premises are deemed relevant to conclusions, but nothing is deemed relevant to
any premise except that premise itself. Similarly, a sequential priority rule corresponds
to a relevance relation that takes the form of a linear order over the propositions; and a
distance-based rule corresponds to one where every proposition is relevant to every other.
Dietrich￿ s framework allows us to explore how the logical structure of the agenda, the
relevance relation and the conditions on aggregation jointly determine the space of possi-
bilities. However, while aggregation rules that give up independence have some attractive
properties, their drawback can be shown to be manipulability, both by strategic voting
(Dietrich and List [11], Nehring and Puppe [47, 49]) and by strategic agenda setting (List
[33], Dietrich [5]).
4.4 Focusing on special agendas
As noted, total blockedness is a demanding condition on the interconnectedness between
propositions that is by no means satis￿ed in all judgment-aggregation settings of interest.
Several papers in the literature look at natural agendas that are not totally blocked,
and ask whether any of the aggregation rules that become possible here are also plausible.
While we have already considered non-independent rules that exploit a special structure of
the agenda by prioritizing some propositions over others ￿e.g., ￿ premises￿over ￿ conclusions￿
￿our focus is now on aggregation rules that retain propositionwise independence.
Consider again the class of agendas that permit a natural division between a set of
issues that are the ￿ criteria￿for a particular decision and a single issue that is the ￿ decision￿
itself: In the court example, the ￿ decision￿is whether or not the defendant is liable, and
the ￿ criteria￿are whether or not he did it and whether or not he was obliged not to do it.
Another example could be our academic hiring committee if a decision is made only on one
candidate, but the committee must also form collective judgments on several criteria that
the candidate might or might not satisfy: say, whether her ability is su¢ cient, whether her
￿eld of expertise ￿ts departmental needs, and so on. In the cleanest such examples, there
are no (non-trivial) logical connections between the criteria except those that run via the
decision; that is, any combination of judgments on the criteria alone is consistent (provided
no proposition-negation pair is accepted). We can then summarize the constraints on the
problem by asking which combinations of judgments on the criteria force the decision to
go one way, say, ￿ acceptance￿ ; and which force it to go the other, say, ￿ rejection￿ . Following
Nehring and Puppe [50] in the symposium, call the former set of combinations of judgments
on the criteria the acceptance region; and the latter set the rejection region.
21In some cases, the acceptance and rejection regions exactly partition the set of possible
(complete and consistent) judgments on the criteria; that is, if all of the criteria are settled,
then a particular decision is entailed. These cases are called truth-functional. For example,
in the court case, the defendant is liable if and only if he did it and he was obliged not to do
it. Nehring and Puppe [48] and Dokow and Holzman [21] analyze truth-functional agendas
like these. Nehring and Puppe [48] show that, for such agendas, given the other Arrovian
conditions (including independence) plus monotonicity, dictatorship can be avoided if and
only if either the acceptance or the rejection region contains essentially only a single
combination of judgments on the criteria.16 For example, in the court case, the acceptance
region contains only the combination of criterion-judgments ￿ he did it￿and ￿ he was obliged
not to do it￿ . Even in cases like these, the only possible aggregation rules are oligarchic
with default: There is a particular (consistent and complete) default judgment set J0 ￿ X
and a non-empty set of oligarchs M ￿ N such that any collective departure from the
default judgment in J0 requires unanimous consent among the oligarchs on that particular
departure. The natural default in the court setting would be that the defendant did not
do it, was not obliged not to do it, and is not liable. An admissible aggregation rule would
be to pick two speci￿c judges and only to depart from the default on each issue if both
agreed to do so on that issue. The only anonymous such oligarchy is a unanimity rule
with default, where M = N (which is distinct from the unanimity rules we encountered in
our discussion of relaxing completeness). A feature of oligarchies with default is that each
oligarch has the power to veto any move away from the default. Thus, although we get a
possibility result with independence here, the possibility is limited.
Many settings, however, are not truth-functional: Some combination of judgments on
the criteria still leave room for the decision to go either way. The hiring committee above
might be constrained to accept the candidate if they judge her to meet both criteria, and
be constrained to reject her if they judge her to fail on both criteria, but they might
be able to accept or reject her if they judge her to meet just one criterion. Many such
problems have a natural ￿ monotonicity in criteria￿ : With an appropriate relabeling of
criterion-propositions and their negations, accepting more criteria cannot push you out of
an acceptance region or into a rejection region, and accepting fewer criteria cannot push
you into acceptance or out of rejection. In their second symposium paper, Nehring and
Puppe [50] show that, in such cases, there are aggregation rules satisfying the Arrovian
conditions plus monotonicity that avoid veto power ￿and thereby avoid oligarchy with
default ￿if and only if either the acceptance region or the rejection region is empty.17
The hiring-committee example above violates this stipulation but if the committee￿ s only
constraint were to reject the candidate if she failed on ability and ￿eld ￿i.e., the committee
were never forced to accept the candidate ￿then veto power could be avoided.
Some of the possible aggregation rules in this case seem natural given the structure of
the constraints. In particular, there are admissible aggregation rules that require super-
majorities (but not unanimity) on any criterion that might push the collective judgment
into the non-empty acceptance or rejection region. In the example, supermajorities would
be required to conclude that the candidate has insu¢ cient ability and to conclude that
the candidate does not meet the needs of the department. The ￿nal decision to hire or
16The quali￿cation ￿ essentially￿is needed because there could be ￿ redundant￿criteria that do not a⁄ect
the decision either way. Formally, the condition is sometimes called ￿ conjunctive￿ : Either acceptance
or rejection of the decision-proposition is logically equivalent to a particular (consistent) conjunction of
acceptances or rejections on each of the non-redundant criterion-propositions.
17This result requires the number of voters to be large relative to the number of criteria.
22not could then be made by simple majority rule. The general intuition here is that if a
particular proposition is critical in that accepting it might severely constrain collective
acceptance of other propositions, then we need to hold it to a higher acceptance standard;
in this case, a supermajority requirement.
This theme returns in Dietrich￿ s symposium paper [8]. Dietrich discusses, among other
things, what he calls simple implication agendas, which contain only atomic propositions
(and their negations) and propositions (and their negations) asserting an implication such
as p ! q involving just two atomic propositions. In the expert-panel example of Section
1, the implication p ! q was that if CO2 emissions are above a given threshold, then there
will be a temperature increase. Some care is required in interpreting the ￿ !￿here. Under
the standard material interpretation of propositional logic, p ! q is equivalent to ￿ :p or
q￿ . This would rule out (i.e., render inconsistent) the natural sounding judgments favored
by big oil companies ￿￿ CO2 emissions have not exceeded a given threshold, and, even if
they had, there still would not be a temperature increase￿￿since this combines :p and
:(p ! q). Dietrich argues that when the implication p ! q is itself open to judgment
independent of the evaluation of the atomic propositions, it is more natural to adopt a
￿ subjunctive￿interpretation of the implication. Under such an interpretation, p ! q rules
out combining p and :q but is consistent with any other pair of judgments on p and q.
With this interpretation of implication, Dietrich provides a startling possibility result
for simple implication agendas using just quota rules: Each proposition p 2 X is collec-
tively accepted if and only if the number of individuals accepting p is greater than or
equal to a proposition-speci￿c quota mp (where, to ensure completeness and to avoid triv-
ial inconsistencies, mp + m:p = n + 1).18 Dietrich shows that, for any simple implication
agenda, a quota rule ensures consistency if and only if mq ￿ mp +mp!q ￿n for all p ! q
in the agenda. For intuition, suppose that both p and p ! q are collectively accepted.
Then the number of individuals who accept both p and p ! q is at least equal to the right
side of the inequality. Each of these individuals must also accept q, and the inequality
says that there are enough of them to ensure the collective acceptance of q, which avoids
inconsistency.
An immediate consequence of this result is that if the agenda contains p ! q, then
mq ￿ mp. In our expert-panel example, the quota to accept the putative ￿ cause￿(CO2
emissions are above the threshold) must be at least as high as that to accept its putative
￿ e⁄ect￿(temperatures will rise). More generally, if an atomic proposition occurs early in a
chain of reasoning ￿for example, if it refers to a more fundamental cause ￿it must have a
weakly higher quota. The only way to maintain neutrality across atomic propositions is to
set the quota mp!q on each implication-proposition equal to n; i.e., to require unanimity.
In particular, if there are ￿ cycles￿of implications in the agenda, then every p ! q in such
a cycle must be held to a unanimity requirement.
Taken together, these papers suggest that speci￿c agendas admit speci￿c aggregation
rules tailored to the setting at hand. A more general lesson, however, is that critical
propositions need to be held to higher acceptance standards. Understanding this general
lesson takes us full-circle back to the notion of contagion introduced in Section 3. Recall
that, if we can reach q from p by a sequence of conditional entailments, then any winning
coalition for p is also winning for q. In the case of quota rules, this means that the quota
for q is lower than that for p: perhaps, a simple majority versus a supermajority. More
18For a discussion of quota rules on general agendas, see Dietrich and List [10].
23generally, if there is possible contagion from p to q, then consistent aggregation rules that
maintain independence must make it weakly harder to accept p than to accept q.
5 The abstract algebraic model
Some papers in the symposium use the logic-based framework outlined in Section 2 above.
Others, however, use the abstract algebraic framework introduced by Wilson [61] and
extended by Rubinstein and Fishburn [56], in which judgments take the form of 0 (￿ false￿ )
or 1 (￿ true￿ ) evaluations on a ￿nite non-empty set K = f1;2;:::;kg of binary issues. An
evaluation vector is an assignment of 0s and 1s to these issues, formally an element of
f0;1gk.
Just as some sets of propositions in the logic-based model are deemed inconsistent,
so some evaluation vectors are deemed infeasible. Formally, let Z ￿ f0;1gk be the set
of evaluation vectors that are deemed feasible. For instance, in the expert-panel example
of Section 1, there are three issues, corresponding to the three proposition-negation pairs
fp;:pg, fp ! q;:(p ! q)g, and fq;:qg. The set of feasible evaluation vectors is either
Z = f(1;1;1);(1;0;0);(0;1;0);(0;1;1)g
or
Z = f(1;1;1);(1;0;0);(0;1;0);(0;1;1);(0;0;0);(1;0;1);(0;0;0)g,
depending on whether the conditional ! is interpreted as a ￿ material￿conditional (as in
standard propositional logic) or as a ￿ subjunctive￿conditional (as in conditional logics,
like those discussed in Dietrich￿ s symposium paper [8]).
As the name suggests, the abstract model abstracts from some details of the real-
world settings. In particular, the same feasible set can arise from very di⁄erent contexts.
For example, on the one hand, consider the preference aggregation problem with three
alternatives x, y and z, and three issues: fx ￿ y;y ￿ xg, fy ￿ z;z ￿ yg, and fx ￿ z;z ￿
xg. On the other hand, consider a faculty committee charged to hire some candidates.
Suppose there is an (as yet) unspeci￿ed number of slots and only three candidates: two
women, A and B, and one man, C. Suppose further that, for some reason, the university
administrators decide to put just three propositions (and their negations) on the agenda
for the faculty committee to decide: ￿ hire at least A￿ , ￿ hire at least B￿ , and ￿ hire at least
two of the candidates including at least one woman￿ . (Notice that this agenda, perhaps
by design, does not allow the direct expression of support for C only.) Both of these very
di⁄erent aggregation problems yield the same set of feasible evaluations:
Z = f(1;1;1);(0;0;0);(0;1;0);(1;0;1);(1;0;0);(0;1;1)g.
In the ￿rst problem, (1;1;0) and (0;0;1) represent cyclic preferences and hence are ruled
out. In the second, they represent internally inconsistent choices and hence are ruled out.
The details of the setting, including the nature of the inconsistencies, are abstracted away.
The advantage of one framework over the other depends on the setting (e.g., the nature
of the constraints) and the question at hand (e.g., the degree to which the interpretation
of the propositions and their interconnections matter).
246 Concluding remarks
Arguably, the initial phase of the recent research e⁄ort on judgment aggregation, namely
the quest to extend some classic results on preference aggregation to general judgment-
aggregation problems, is now largely complete. In addition to the results discussed above,
particularly Arrow￿ s theorem and various responses to it, some other classic results have
been generalized, notably the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem (Nehring and Puppe [49, 47]
and relatedly Dietrich and List [11]), and Sen￿ s liberal paradox (Dietrich and List [14] and
relatedly Nehring [45, 46]).19
There are at least two challenges for the next phase of work in this area. The move to
general judgment-aggregation settings has introduced additional complexities not present
in preference aggregation. One important challenge will be to explore those additional
compexities further, especially in the case of aggregation rules that give up propositionwise
independence. As noted, Dietrich and Mongin￿ s symposium contribution on premise-based
approaches [20] and Dietrich￿ s recent work on general relevance relations [7] are steps in
this direction, but more work remains to be done on characterizations of compelling non-
independent aggregation rules.
Another challenge will be to extend the theory of judgment aggregation from the case of
binary judgments to that of general propositional attitudes, which need not be binary and
which may be governed by very di⁄erent rationality or feasibility constraints. Recent con-
tributions along these lines include some works on judgment aggregation in many-valued
logics (Pauly and van Hees [52], van Hees [60]), some works on the relationship between
judgment aggregation and probability aggregation (Osherson and Vardi [51], Dietrich and
List [12], Nehring [46]), and some works on the aggregation of abstract, non-binary evalua-
tions (Rubinstein and Fishburn [56], Dokow and Holzman [22]) or of general propositional
attitudes (Dietrich and List [17], Duddy and Piggins [25]). The non-binary case, like the
non-independent one, permits far more possibilities than the more constrained binary and
independent case, and the di¢ culty will be to arrive at elegant characterizations of aggre-
gation rules given the additional degrees of freedom. We hope that the present symposium
will provide a useful entrance point to this vibrant area of research and stimulate further
work.
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